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At Present, China is on the stage of transforming from a traditional economy to 
a modern economy and from a planned economic system to a socialist market 
economic system. In this process, political corruption breeds and spreads at a speed 
much faster than GDP growth. Corruption severely damages our social, political and 
economic development and is one of the main factors that affect the stabilization in 
our society. In view of this, we are highly concerned about corruptive phenomenon 
and it is urgent to explore the deep-seated reasons behind it. Previous studies 
examine this issue mostly from political, legal, moral or ethnic perspectives. In this 
paper, the author combines politics with economics and explores political corruption 
from an economic perspective. Through a rational and empirical analysis of China’s 
corruptive phenomenon, the author brings out the intrinsic quality of corruption, 
examines the exchange of public power with economic assets, explores the economic 
root cause of corruption and its harm to economic development, and gives 
suggestions on fighting against corruption. 
 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
 
The first chapter formulates the economic concept of corruption. According to 
economic person hypothesis, corruption happens when a public official as a rational 
economic man applies the rules of equivalent exchange in the market to the handling 
of public affairs, capitalizes public power and misuses public office for private gain. 
The essence of corruption is trading power for money. 
In this chapter, the author describes three major characteristics of corruption in 
China in transition: firstly, amassing huge fortunes motivates public officials to trade 
their power; secondly, the initial aggression on the means of livelihood has gradually 
developed into an aggression on the means and factors of production, and the 
accumulation of personal belongings to an accumulation of private capital; thirdly, in 













loopholes and their methods used are very cunning. 
 
The second chapter focuses on the economic root cause of corruption. The 
theory of rent-seeking, principal-agent theory, the theory of cost and income are 
applied to analyze the breeding and spread of corruptive behavior. The author 
discusses the reasons for corruption from four aspects:  
Firstly, as the subject of corruption, public officials (as rational economic 
persons) taking bribes and their counterparts make the choice actively rather than on 
impulse.  
secondly, the following incentives can be observed: first, the supervision system 
is yet to be improved as existing rules and regulations are out of date while new ones 
are not yet formulated to keep up with the pace of transition; second, the real cost 
and chance cost are rather low and the levels of criminal penalties are inadequate; 
third, an appropriate and effective supervisory mechanism with sufficient methods 
and smooth channels are not yet established; fourth, information asymmetry leaves 
public officials opportunities to use their power for their own advantage. 
Thirdly, the following behavior and phenomena can be observed: first, 
rent-seeking activities. Some economic subjects go to the ministries and offer money 
in order to enjoy preferential policies. Some officials take a cut in this process and 
trade their power for money. Second, some so-called “insiders” exploit their 
positions for personal gains. After the initiation of the reform and opening-up, when 
ownership structure is under readjustment, the demarcation of property right over 
State-owned assets in a large number of enterprises is not clear. Some executives, as 
the actual “owner”, command and embezzle a large quantity of those state-owned 
assets through self-dealing. Third, some “agents” encroach on the clients’ rights and 
interests taking advantage of information asymmetry. 
 
The third chapter examines the enormous bane that corruption brings to China’s 














hemorrhage of public property. Secondly, corruption undermines the distribution of 
resources and reduces productivity. Thirdly, proper relation of distribution is difficult 
to establish and the gap between the rich and the poor widens. Fourthly, economic 
policies are carried out in a distorted way and economic restructuring are thus 
hampered. Fifthly, the normal order of the market economy is damaged and the 
environment for economic development is deteriorated.  
 
The fourth chapter offers five solutions to corruption from an economic 
perspective. Firstly, Speed up reform, establish a government system corresponding 
to the socialist market economy and eliminate the soil for breeding corruption. 
Secondly, further deepening economic restructuring, establish a complete and 
standard modern enterprise system, develop a sound market system and solve the 
problem of “insiders” controlling state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, improve the 
economic mechanism of fighting and diminishing corruption. Fourthly, reinforce the 
fight against corruption and strengthen supervision so as to increase the cost of 
corruption. 
 


























目  录 
前  言.........................................................................................................1 
第一章 腐败的经济学本质 ......................................................................2 




第二节 腐败的经济学定义 ..................................................................................3 
第三节 我国转型期腐败现象的经济学特点 ......................................................4 
第二章 我国转型期腐败现象产生的经济学根源 ..................................5 
第一节 腐败主体的主动性行为选择 ..................................................................5 









第三章 腐败的经济危害 ........................................................................17 
第一节 腐败造成巨大的公共财产流失 ............................................................17 
第二节 腐败降低生产效率 ................................................................................18 
第三节 腐败加剧贫富分化 ................................................................................19 
第四节 腐败妨碍经济转型 ................................................................................19 
第五节 腐败恶化经济发展环境 ........................................................................20 













第一节 加快政府体制改革 ................................................................................22 
第二节 进一步深化经济体制改革 ....................................................................24 
























前  言 
 1
前  言 








































































④杨杰：《腐败行为的经济学分析》，《当代经济》，2008 年第 11 期 
⑤陈武明：《路在何方——关于当前的反腐败和反自由化斗争》，浙江大学出版社，2002 年 













































                                                        
①王沪宁：《腐败与反腐败——当代国外腐败问题研究》，上海人民出版社，1999 年 




























8250 万、受贿 2661 万。目前正在调查的杭州市副市长许永迈，初步查明受贿


























Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
